Position Statement by the Civil Society Coalition for Indonesia’s Open Government Partnership (IJRS, TI-I, ICW, PWYP Indonesia)
Last week (April 20, 2025), the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office announced the detention of several individuals involved in an alleged bribery case related to the handling of a cooking oil corruption case at the Jakarta Corruption Court. In addition to judges, the Attorney General’s Office also detained lawyers, court clerks, and business actors suspected of colluding to secure a favorable ruling for the defendants in the cooking oil corruption case. As a result, the case was recently decided with a “not guilty” verdict, meaning the defendants were proven to have committed the alleged acts but were deemed not criminally liable. This incident highlights the vulnerability of our judicial system to corrupt practices. This situation is deeply ironic when viewed in light of 2024 data, which shows that the state allocates approximately 224 trillion to 306 trillion rupiah annually for corruption prevention and eradication.1 Furthermore, Indonesia is a proponent of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), with one of its primary agendas being the eradication of corruption. Thus, how should we address the phenomenon of bribery in case handling and the ongoing judicial reforms that have yet to show improvement with the exposure of this case?
In this regard, the Civil Society Coalition for Indonesia’s Open Government Partnership identifies three critical points that require attention. First, bribery in courts is not only related to the outcome of a case but also to the handling process, which is susceptible to corrupt practices. According to the 2021 Access to Justice Index, at least 13.9% of respondents admitted to paying bribes or illegal fees, typically to expedite their legal processes.2 This indicates that failures in ensuring accessible processes can serve as an “entry point” for judicial bribery. Therefore, efforts to eradicate judicial corruption cannot solely focus on case outcomes but must also address the procedural aspects of the judicial system itself.
In this context, procedural aspects do not only pertain to the speed of case handling but encompass all efforts to ensure the quality of judicial processes in line with fair trial principles. Issues such as balanced processes, the independence of judicial actors (including their competence, welfare, and potential conflicts of interest), and adequate infrastructure are inseparable and must be prioritized in preventing and eradicating judicial corruption. Without fair processes, judicial bribery is likely to persist. For those with greater wealth and a pragmatic mindset, bribery may simply be viewed as a risk or cost of doing business. Meanwhile, corrupt judicial actors may see such practices as normal, unavoidable, and a natural consequence of the existing system. At its extreme, the judicial system may become accessible only to those who can afford to pay and meet the demands of corrupt actors. In such conditions, the broader public bears the greatest burden, losing their rights as the “cost” of accessing justice becomes prohibitively high.
Second, the recurring incidents of bribery in case handling must also be linked to provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) that grant discretionary authority to law enforcement actors. Such discretion is often not accompanied by adequate accountability, resulting in no clear consequences for legal products resulting from unlawful exercise of authority. In this case, the discretion in question refers to the judge’s authority to issue rulings, which was exercised in exchange for bribes. This situation is generally addressed by the principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur, meaning a final and binding court ruling is presumed to be correct. However, parties still have the right to pursue legal remedies without violating this principle. This means that parties harmed by a ruling resulting from bribery can, in principle, pursue legal remedies, as seen in this case where the prosecutor filed an appeal (kasasi). However, this raises questions about what happens if such bribery occurs again, but the parties no longer have opportunities to pursue further legal remedies. Should such a ruling be corrected, or should it still be considered valid and legally binding?
In such cases, wouldn’t it be ideal for the case to be re-examined by a new panel of judges to eliminate doubts about the initial ruling? Normatively, the KUHAP does not clearly regulate the status of such rulings. This creates two possible responses. On one hand, law enforcement may consider the ruling valid and binding despite being the result of bribery. However, this risks public perception that such practices protect corruptors and could erode trust in the judiciary. On the other hand, law enforcement could seek to correct the initial ruling. In this case, the only remaining legal remedy is a request for Reconsideration (Peninjauan Kembali or PK). However, Article 263(1) of the KUHAP prohibits PK for acquittals or “not guilty” verdicts, meaning cases like this one, with a “not guilty” ruling, leave no avenue to correct a ruling tainted by bribery. Additionally, the PK process itself poses issues, as the Supreme Court’s review does not allow for re-examination or re-proving of facts as in a first-instance trial. Yet, there is a high likelihood of irregularities in the initial examination, making it critical for a new panel of judges to re-examine the case to uncover true evidence and facts, rather than relying solely on the initial trial’s findings, PK submissions, or new evidence (novum). This issue, along with other problematic forms of discretion in our criminal procedure law, warrants discussion. This is particularly timely, as the House of Representatives (DPR) is currently initiating the legislative process to revise the KUHAP.
Third, the involvement of multiple actors in bribery practices indicates that reforms must extend beyond the judiciary. Judges are undeniably key actors who significantly influence bribery practices, making it essential to foster an anti-corruption culture among them. However, if reforms target only judges, the desired changes will not be sustainable. Judicial corruption has a unique characteristic wherein corrupt actors do not necessarily need to actively involve judges to manipulate cases. In a bribery case at the Supreme Court, a court clerk without authority to issue rulings could sell the contents of a ruling by offering it to both litigating parties. Such actors only need to demonstrate proximity to the presiding judge without knowing the ruling’s contents, as they are guaranteed to profit from both sides. Similar practices can also be perpetrated by other legal professions involved in the judicial system.
Based on these three points, the Civil Society Coalition for Indonesia’s Open Government Partnership issues the following demands:
- Urge the Supreme Court to undertake judicial reforms to eliminate opportunities for corruption and ensure the application of fair trial principles in every criminal justice process.
- Urge the Government and the DPR to revise criminal procedure laws regulating the discretion of actors in the criminal justice system without clear legal consequences. In the context of bribery in case handling, the primary issue concerns the status of court rulings proven to result from bribery.
- Urge all legal professional organizations to actively promote an anti-corruption culture, both independently and collaboratively, to create a judicial environment free from corruption.
Contacts:
- Muhammad Rizaldi (Indonesia Judicial Research Society) – mrizaldi@ijrs.or.id
- Izza Akbarani (Transparency International Indonesia/TI-I) – iakbarani@ti.or.id
- Almas Sjafrina (Indonesia Corruption Watch/ICW) – almas@antikorupsi.org
- Meliana Lumbantoruan (Publish What You Pay/PWYP Indonesia) – meliana@pwyp-indonesia.org